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Use of Force for the Protection of
Nationals Abroad: The Entebbe Incident
INTRODUCTION
O N SUNDAY, June 27, 1976, an Air France jetliner with
256 passengers and a crew of 12, en route from Tel Aviv to
Paris via Athens, was hijacked after taking off from Athens.
After refueling at Benghazi in Libya, the four hijackers, claiming
to be members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine, ordered the plane to Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where
it was given permission to land.' Thus began an act of air piracy
that was to end 7 days later on July 4, 1976, with the success-
ful Israeli airborne commando raid on Entebbe Airport freeing
105 hostages held by the hijackers. All of the 105 hostages were
Israeli nationals or dual nationals.2
This is the most recent example of unilateral military action
by a State to protect the lives and/or property of its nationals
abroad. Between the years 1813-1927, the United States alone
employed military force on at least 70 occasions to protect Ameri-
can citizens abroad. 3  Several other Powers, including Great
Britain, also landed forces in foreign countries for the same pur-
pose on a number of occasions. 4 In a few cases, notably the Boxer
Rebellion in China in 1900 and the Congo Action in 1964, there
was collective intervention to protect nationals of several coun-
tries.
This note will examine the Israeli commando raid on Entebbe
Airport in light of the historical development of the principle of
forcible self-help by an individual State (or group of States) for
I N.Y. Times, June 28, 1976, at 1, cols. 2-4.
2 N.Y. Times, July 4, 1976, at 1, c6ls. 7-8. The hijackers released a total of
147 non-Israeli passengers in two groups on June 30 and July 1 prior to the
Israeli action. Three hostages were killed in the raid and one was left behind
in a Ugandan hospital, later presumed killed by Ugandan authorities. The
casualties also included one Israeli soldier, seven terrorists, and between 20-30
Ugandan soldiers killed.
3 D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (1958).
4 For several notable examples, see I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE BY STATES 290-98 (1963) and BOWETT, supra note 3, at 100.
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the protection of nationals abroad. The general acceptance of
this principle during the 19th century reflected the decentralized
state of international law in which each State held itself free
to decide when particular circumstances warranted seeking its own
remedy by armed force.5 However, the law governing recourse
to forcible self-help has been radically affected by the develop-
ment of new rules beginning with the League Covenant in 1920.
Accordingly, the history of this doctrine can be divided into two
rather distinct periods: (1) Its formulation and application during
the 19th and early 20th centuries; and (2) its increasingly ques-
tionable legality since 1920 with the signing of the League Cove-
nant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) and the United Nations
Charter (1945). From this framework, the precedential value
of the Israeli rescue action will be weighed and its implications
for the legality of future forcible self-help to protect nationals
abroad will be discussed.
NINETEENTH CENTURY DOCTRINE AND APPLICATION
According to the traditional doctrine of state responsibility,
individuals were to be considered as objects rather than subjects
of international law. A State was generally free to treat persons
within its borders as it wished. However, an exception arose
when the persons being injured were nationals of another State.
As Vattel wrote in 1758:
Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State,
which must protect that citizen. The sovereign of the injured
citizen must avenge the deed and, if possible, force the aggressor
to give full satisfaction or punish him, since otherwise the citizen
will not obtain the chief end of civil society, which is protec-
tion.6
Because the individual had no rights under international law, the
nationals of a State were considered an extension of the State
itself. Thus, a wrong committed on an alien was considered an
injury to the State to which the alien owed allegiance. The "in-
jured" State therefore had standing to seek redress under interfia-
tional law, and the measures available for obtaining redress
ranged from diplomatic notes through forcible self-help to actual
war.
7
5 C. Fenwick, Intervention: Individual and Collective, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 645, 647
(1945).
Cited in W. BISHOp, INTERNATIONAL LAW 848 (3rd ed. 1971).
E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 448-53
(1915), and A. THOMAS and A. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION 307 (1956).
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Customary international law has long sanctioned the use of
armed force by a State to protect the lives and property of na-
tionals abroad. Numerous publicists, among them Oppenheim,8
Bowett, 9  Hyde, 1°  Dunn," and Jessup, 2  have recognized this
right of forcible self-help. This right was reaffirmed immediately
before World War I at the Hague Convention No. II of 1907 as
well as in the arbitration between Great Britain and Spain in
1925, known as the Spanish Moroccan Claims. In the former, the
major powers insisted on retaining undiminished their right of
forcible self-help with one exception, that being the case of con-
tract debts. t3  In the latter, Judge Huber, as rapporteur of the
arbitration commission, stated:
However, it cannot be denied that at a certain point the interest
of a State in exercising protection over its nationals and their
property can take precedence over territorial sovereignty, de-
spite the absence of any conventional provisions. This right of
intervention has been claimed by all states; only its limits are
disputed. 14
"The right of protection over citizens abroad, which a State holds, may
cause an intervention by right to which the other party is legally bound to sub-
mit. And it matters not whether protection of the life, security, honour, or
property of a citizen abroad is Concerned." 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 135, at 309 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
9 "The right of the state to intervene by the use or threat of force for the
protection of its nationals suffering injuries within the territory of another state
is generally admitted, both in the writing of jurists and in the practice of states."
BOWETT, supra note 3, at 87.
10 "When, however, in any country, the safety of foreigners in their persons
and property is jeopardized by the impotence or disposition of the territorial
sovereign to afford adequate protection, the landing or entrance of a foreign
public force of the State to which the nationals belong, is to be anticipated."
1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 202, at 647 (2nd rev. ed. 1947).
11 "It is only occasionally, when aliens are placed in a situation of grave
danger from which the normal methods of diplomacy cannot extricate them, or
where diplomatic negotiation for some other reason is believed to be useless,
that forceful intervention is apt to take place." F. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF
NATIONALS 19 (1932).
12 "Traditional international law has recognized the right of a state to
employ its armed forces for the protection of the lives and property of its na-
tionals abroad in situations where the state of the residence, because of revo-
lutionary disturbances or other reasons, is unable or unwilling to grant them
the protection they are entitled." P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 169
(1949).
13 C. H. M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in
International Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague Academy of International Law)
467-68 (11-1952).
14 Beni-Madan, Rzini Claim, Anglo-Spanish Arbitrations, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A.
616 (1925).
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Nevertheless, the right of forcible self-help for the protection
of nationals abroad did not develop unrestrained. It was opposed
by the equally well recognized principle of nonintervention. In-
tervention, defined as the dictatorial interference in the domestic
or foreign affairs of another State which impaired that State's in-
dependence,i5 was generally condemned as contrary to interna-
tional law. 16 In an attempt to reconcile the doctrine of noninter-
vention with the right of forcible self-help to protect nationals
abroad, the softer term "interposition" was introduced in the early
part of the 20th century. Interposition has been defined as
"justifiable action undertaken by a State to induce another State
to respect its rights under international law, including the rights of
its nationals. ' 17 At the Sixth International Conference of Ameri-
can States held in Havana in 1928, the United States, through
Secretary of State Hughes, endorsed the distinction between in-
tervention and interposition. Secretary Hughes contended that
forcible self-help to protect the lives and property of a State's na-
tionals was not a case of intervention, but was rather justifiable as
interposition of a temporary character."i8 This distinction, how-
ever, was sharply criticized as artificial and unnecessary 19 and
consequently never became a part of customary international law.
Hence, the right of forcible self-help to protect the lives of nation-
als of the intervening State either was not intervention at all,20
or, if it was, then a legally justifiable exception. 21
THE STATUS OF THE CUSTOMARY RULE IN MODERN LAW
The customary principles of forcible self-help short of war -
including protection of nationals abroad - were sharply curtailed
Is J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 402 (6th ed. 1963).
16 Id.
17 E. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1921).
18 See 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (2nd ed. 1970).
19 Waldock, supra note 13, at 467. But see Fawcett, Intervention in Interna-
tional Law, A Study of Some Recent Cases, 103 RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague Academy
of International Law) 370 (11-1961).
20 "Traditionally international law allowed individual States or groups of
States to take appropriate measures in the territories of other States for protec-
tion and enforcement of their rights. Such action was not technically interven-
tion." D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 326 (1965).
21 "To attempt to limit the meaning of intervention to exclude such action
may not be warranted. The dispatch of forces to another nation would seem to
be an arrogation of the sovereign attributes of that state and, if done without its
consent, an intervention. . . . Nevertheless, such intervention may be legally
justifiable." A. THOMAS and A. THOMAS, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS
1965 - LEGAL ASPECTS 13 (Hammarskjold Forum 1966).
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by the combined effects of the League Covenant (1920) and the
Pact of Paris of 1928 (hereafter the KelloggTBriand Pact). The
Covenant, through Articles 12-15, regulated resort to war by
making the legitimacy of war dependent on prior efforts to reach
a settlement through pacific means. The renunciation of war un-
der these Articles was nonetheless not total. The members of the
League remained at liberty to resort to war in certain strictly de-
fined situations: (1) If the other State failed to carry out an award,
judgment, or unanimous report of the Council; (2) if the Council
failed to arrive at a unanimous report; and (3) if a plea of domes-
tic jurisdiction was upheld. 22  Moreover, the Covenant had no
decisive effect on the use of force short of war. The use of the
phrase "resort to war" in the document created a loophole through
which arguments were made that hostilities short of full-dress
war were not prohibited by the Covenant. 23
The Kellogg-Briand Pact was an attempt to plug these so-
called "gaps." Concluded outside the League, the Pact prohib-
ited any resort to war for purely national objects, except in self-
defense. 24  However, as in the Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand
Pact failed to explicitly prohibit recourse to armed force short of
war. The express prohibitions of both instruments applied only to
22 Waldock, supra note 13, at 471.
23 For example, in the Corfu incident, in 1923, just such a contention was
made. In this incident, Italy bombarded and occupied Corfu, claiming this
action to be a legitimate reprisal for the murder of General Tellini by extremists
on Greek territory while he was acting as chairman of the' Greek-Albanian
boundary commission. The Council of the League referred the incident to a
committee of jurists to report whether measures of coercion not intended to
constitute acts of war were consistent with Articles 12-15 of the Covenant,
when taken without prior recourse to arbitration, judicial settlement or con-
ciliation. Unfortunately, the committee simply reported that such coercive
measures might or might not be consistent with the Covenant depending on
the circumstances of the case. 1 F. P. WALTERS, HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS ch. 20 (1952). See BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 298, and Waldock, supra
note 13, at 471-72. But see BRIERLY, supra note 15, at 378, 408, and BOWETT,
supra note 3, at 124, where it is noted that these "gaps" in the Covenant were often
exaggerated, with very little indication that they would be responsible for any
case of a lawful resort to war.
2 The brief provisions of the Pact stipulate the following: (1) The Parties in
the name of their respective peoples condemn recourse to war for the solution
of international controversies and renounce it as instrument of national policy
in their relations with one another; and (2) the Parties agree that all disputes
between them of whatever nature or origin shall never be sought except by
pacific means. Although self-defense was not mentioned in the Pact (or
in the League Covenant), it was universally agreed that any use of force, in-
cluding resort to war, in self-defense was not restricted by either instrument.
Waldock, supra note 13, at 476-78.
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"resort to war." Hence, it was still arguable that they did not for-
bid the customary right of intervention for the protection of na-
tionals. This resulted in the persistence for some years of justifi-
able intervention in both theory and practice. Nevertheless, after
the Pact was signed, the trend in state practice 2s and the views
of a number of jurists26 created a strong presumption that in the
period 1920-1945, the legality of the customary rule permitting re-
sort to force for the protection of nationals was highly question-
able. This view would find increased support with the signing of
the United Nations Charter and in the decision of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case.
The U.N. Charter and Matters of Interpretation
The two basic provisions of the U.N. Charter regulating resort
to force by individual States in their international relations are
Articles 2(4) and 51. In the former, all members renounce "the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations."27 The latter preserves
"the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member. 2 .28 Clearly, the
Charter remedied the apparent defects of the League by explicitly
dealing with "resort to force" and not "resort to war." As the
Preamble to the Charter states, the aim of the United Nations is
"to ensure, by acceptance of principles, and the institution of
methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest. "29 [Emphasis added.] It has therefore been asserted
by some that henceforth, any armed intervention is illegal, except
in self-defense or in execution of collective measures under the
Charter for maintaining or restoring peace. 30 The Charter would
2 For a detailed discussion of the developments in state practice since
1920, see BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 55-111, 216-250.
26 For example, Professor Charles de Visscher, a member of the Committee
of Jurists formed after the Corfu incident, argued thit even if forcible reprisals
are not regarded as a recourse to war, they are nonetheless inconsistent with
the observance in good faith of the express obligations in the Covenant to
submit all disputes "likely to lead to rupture" to pacific settlement. 5 REVUE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 213-30, 377-96 (3rd ser.
1924). See also J. L. Brierly, International Law and Resort to Armed Force, 4
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 309-19 (1932).
27 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
28 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
29 U.N. CHARTER preamble, para. 1.
30 "The broad effect of Article 2(4) is . . . that it entirely prohibits the use
[Vol. 9:117
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thus appear to bar forcible self-help to protect nationals. This
view was reinforced in the General Assembly Declaration of Non-
intervention (1965).31 Although a Declaration of the General As-
sembly is not binding, it nevertheless can shed sonic light on what
States think is the meaning of Article 2(4). In that Declaration,
intervention for any reason is condemned as illegal; there is no
exception for protection of nationals abroad. Nevertheless, one
writer suggests that the final answers to this interpretive prob-
lem should be more "controversial" than those given so far.32
There are basically two schools of thought as to the interpre-
tation of Articles 2(4) and 51. 33  The so-called "restrictionist"
view asserts that resort to force by a Member is unlawful, regard-
less of any wrongs or dangers which provoked it, unless (1) it is
for self-defense against an armed attack, or (2) as collective ac-
tion pursuant to competent decisions of the United Nations organs.
Thus, if neither of these forms of relief are available, the Member
may have to submit indefinitely without redress to the continu-
ance of these wrongs. 34  The "realist" view, on the other hand,
argues in favor of the availability of individual intervention to up-
hold a right illegally denied when collective forms of relief are un-
available. 35 In the context of the legitimacy of the use of force,
both views appear to endorse the principle of nonintervention.
The disagreement is as to whether contemporary international
law imposes an absolute duty of nonintervention on individual
States,. as the "restrictionists" would assert.36 As Vincent points
out, this remains a disputed question:
If the principle of nonintervention retains a place in con-
temporary international law, it is not, if it ever has been, as a
clear injunction against a particular act. The values it draws
attention to and protects are those included under the rubric
of the principle of state sovereignty, such as the rights of a state
or threat of armed force against another state except in self-defense or in execu-
tion of collective measures authorized by the Council or Assembly." BRIERLY,
supra note 15, at 415. See Wright, The Legality of Intervention Under the Uited
Nations Charter, 51 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 88 (1957), and JESSUP, supra
note 12, at 169-170.
31 G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR. Supp.(No.14) 11 U.N. I)oc. A/6014
(1965).
32 R. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA
L. REV. 325, 334 (1967).
33 R. J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 310 (1974).
3' J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 94-95 (1958).
15 Id. at 96.
36 VINCENT, supra note 33, at 314.
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to territorial integrity and political independence. Stand-
ing guard over such imprecisely defined rights and requiring
respect for them in a sort of legal shorthand, the principle ap-
peals more perhaps to governments than it does to jurists. 37
The interpretive disagreements between the restrictionists and
the realists over Articles 2(4) and 51 are two-fold. The first in-
volves the position of wronged States when the collective means
of determining and assuring "the common interest," as recited in
the Preamble, do not work. The restrictionists argue that the
Charter rules out the individual use of force, even in the absence
of collective response and notwithstanding the present defects in
U.N. organs. On the other hand, Stone, a leading advocate of
the realist view, argues that any renunciation of individual force
in the Charter is dependent upon the effective establishment of
"collective institutions and methods; and this has not occured." 3s
In the Preamble to the Charter, the determination "to save suc-
ceeding generations from the scourge of war" is coupled with that
of establishing "conditions under which justice and respect for the
obligations" arising under international law can be maintained.
Stone contends that application of the "extreme" (restrictionist)
view requiring law-abiding Members to abstain from the use of
force even in the face of persistent violations of rights is incon-
sistent with the stress on the requirements of justice and on the
principle of "the sovereign equality of all its Members." To say
that resort to force has been outlawed absolutely when the col-
lective means of relief are not working is to place a greater pre-
mium on peace than justice. 39  The practical effect of such a
maximum principle, as two writers point out, would be a U.N.
Charter which "encumbers rather than advances the human
rights and fundamental freedoms involved in the protection of
aliens abroad."40
The second point of contention is the precise scope of the right
of self-defense under the Charter. Some contend that the com-
bined effect of Articles 2(4) and 51 is to cut down the right of
self-defense to cases falling precisely within the words in Article
51, "if an armed attack occurs." These writers41 assert that Ar-
31 Id. at 310.
M STONE, supra note 34, at 96.
39 Id. at 97.
40 THOMAS and THOMAS, supra note 7, at 312.
41 Two prominent examples are I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 290-98, and
H. KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 791-800 (1950).
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ticle 51 is the exclusive source of the authority to have recourse
to self-defense. Any "threat or use of force" not amounting to
self-defense with reference to an armed attack is automatically a
violation of Article 2(4). Once again, arguing from the "realist"
point of view, Stone asserts that such an "extreme" interpreta-
tion would lead to absurd results.42 Stone and others view the
phrase "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense" in Article 51 as show-
ing a clear intention not to impair the natural right of self-protec-
tion, rooted in general international law, against a forcible threat
to a State's legal rights. As Waldock asserts, "To read Article 51
otherwise is to protect the aggressor's right to the first stroke." 43
The Corfu Channel Case
The differences between the realist and restrictionist schools
of thought are illustrated in the Corfu Channel case. 44 The mate-
rial facts are these. In May 1946, Albanian shore batteries fired
on two British warships without warning as they were sailing
through Albanian territorial waters in the North Corfu Strait by
a channel swept through a minefield. Through diplomatic cor-
respondence Albania denied that foreign warships had a right of
innocent passage through her territorial waters without her autho-
rization. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, asserted that
she had a right of innocent passage and that any further firing
on British warships would be replied to with force. In October
1946, two British cruisers and two destroyers were sent through
the Strait from Corfu to assert their right of passage and to test
Albania's reaction. The crews were at action stations with in-
structions to fire back if attacked. Two ships struck mines within
the channel. The United Kingdom strongly suspected this was the
work of Albania and that the mining of the ships was no accident.
However, the United Kingdom did not at once appeal to the Se-
curity ,Council, fearing that a veto would be applied to any pro-
42 "... suppose military intelligence at the Pentagon received indisputa-
ble evidence that a hostile State was poised to launch intercontinental ballistic
missles, at a fixed zero hour only 24 hours ahead, against New York, Boston,
and Washington, would it be an aggressor under the Charter if it refused to
wait until those cities had received the missles before it reacted by the use of
force?" STONE, supra note 34, at 99.
43 Waldock, supra note 13, at 496-99. But see BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 299,
who asserts that the customary scope of the right of self-defense has probably
narrowed since 1920.
- [1949] l.C.J. 4.
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posal that the area should be swept 'to ascertain who laid the
mines. Instead, it entered Albanian waters with a large force of
minesweepers and swept the channel, discovering a number of
newly laid mines. The United Kingdom soon thereafter referred
the matter to the Security Council which recommended that the
dispute be submitted to the International Court of Justice.
The acts of the United Kingdom raised directly the issues of
self-defense and self-help. The Court found permissible the Oc-
tober passage of the warships as an exercise of a right of inno-
cent passage through an international strait in time of peace.
The Court declared:
The legality of this measure . . .cannot be disputed, provided
that it was carried out in a manner consistent with the require-
ments of international law. The mission was designed to af-
firm a right which had been unjustly denied. The Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom was not bound to abstain from
exercising its right of passage, which the Albanian Govern-
nient had illegally denied4a
But with regard to the subsequent minesweeping operation, the
Court rejected the argument of the United Kingdom that a State
must be allowed a strictly limited right of self-help to investi-
gate the cause of its injury and preserve the evidence. The Court
asserted:
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as
the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has in the past
given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, what-
ever be the present defects in international organization, find
a place in international law.46
The Court thus attempts to distinguish a forcible affirmation
of legal rights (that is, the right of innocent passage), which is le-
gitimate, and forcible self-help to obtain redress for rights already
violated (that is, the minesweeping operation), which is illegal.
The Court could not accept the particular plea of self-help by the
United Kingdom because "between independent states, respect
for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of interna-
tional relations. ' ' 47 The Court continued:
The Court recognizes that the Albanian Government's com-
plete failure to carry out its duties after the explosions, and the
dilatory nature of its diplomatic Notes, are extenuating cir-
45 [1949] I.C.J. 28.




cumstances for the action of the United Kingdom Government.
But to ensure respect for international law, of which it is the
organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British
Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty. 8
Thus, this opinion would seem to confirm the restrictionist view
of the right to use force: The right of one State to intervene
was not superior to the right of another to territorial sovereignty,
"whatever be the present defects in international organization."
But in its support of a right of forcible affirmation of legal rights,
the Court fails to justify such measures by specific reference to
the U.N. Charter. It relies instead on general principles of inter-
national law. Unfortunately, then, by its generality and ambiguity,
and the absence of any reference to Articles 2(4) and 51 of the
Charter, the value of the Court's judgment is decreased. 49
THE ENTEBBE INCIDENT: A QUESTION OF PEACE OR JUSTICE?
The Israeli commando raid at Entebbe Airport raises anew
the particular difficulties faced by a national decision-maker who
looks abroad and sees a sizable group of nationals of his country in
grave danger of loss of life. Indeed, the Entebbe incident exempli-
fies the prototypical situation involving a State's use of limited
force for the protection of its nationals from an imminent threat of
injury or death, where the State in whose territory they are located
either is unwilling or unable to protect them. Uganda's behavior
between 28 June and 4 July strongly suggests that it, at least
tacitly, supported and collaborated with the hijackers. Although
the Ugandan authorities helped secure the release of non-Israeli
passengers,50 they otherwise assisted the hijackers in maintaining
control over the aircraft, its crew, and the remaining passengers
for the purpose of compelling the release of certain terrorists in
custody in Israel and elsewhere.si Thus, the separation and re-
lease of the non-Israeli passengers and the apparent unwillingness
of the Government of Uganda to take any steps necessary to pro-
48 Id.
49 For an' excellent critique of the Corfu Channel case, see BROWNLIE, supra
note 4, at 283-89. See also Waldock, supra note 13, at 499-503 and BRIELY, supra
note 15, at 421-430.
50 See note 2 supra.
51 N.Y. Times, July 5, 1976, at 1, cols. 2-3. Several of the released hostages
reported that when President Amin arrived on the scene, he and the purported
leader of the hijackers embraced. Further, it was reported that Ugandan soldiers
intermittantly took over the hijackers' guard functions so that they could rest, and,
that other Palestinians were permitted to join the hijackers at the airport.
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tect the remaining Jewish hostages except through the satisfaction
of the hijackers' demands, were compelling arguments to the Gov-
ernment of Israel that failure to meet the hijackers' demands
would result in the death of the Israeli hostages. As Mr. Scran-
ton, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, remarked to
the Security Council:
Israel had good reason to believe that at the time it acted Is-
raeli nationals were in imminent danger of execution by the hi-
jackers. Moreover, the actions necessary to release the Israeli
nationals or to prevent substantial loss of Israeli lives had not
been taken by the Government of Uganda, nor was there a rea-
sonable expectation such actions would be taken.52
Israel also asserted s3 that Uganda's behavior constituted a
flagrant violation of Uganda's obligations under the 1970 Hague
Convention for the Supression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. s4
Both Uganda and Israel are signatories to this Convention. How-
ever, even if the validity of this assertion is assumed arquendo,
under the Corfu doctrine, any failure of duty on the part of Uganda
- either in its failure to protect Israeli nationals within its terri-
tory, or its putative violation of the 1970 Hague Convention -
would merely be considered "extenuating circumstances" that
cannot excuse Israel's violation of Uganda's territorial sovereignty.
As with the particular plea of self-help made by the United
Kingdom in the Corfu Channel case, the International Court of
Justice would reject any argument for a strictly limited right of
self-help to protect nationals because such an "alleged right of
intervention . . . has in the past given rise to most serious abuses
and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in interna-
tional organization, find a place in international law."55
The apparent effect of Corfu Channel is to limit severely the
options available to a head of government. A national decision-
52 31 U.N. SCOR (1941st mtg.) 31, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1941 (1976).
53 31 U.N. SCOR (1939th mtg.) 51, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1939 (1976).
- 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192. Under Article 9 of the Convention,
parties are required, in the event of an unlawful seizure of an aircraft in flight,
to "take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its law-
ful commander .. "q to "facilitate the continuation of the journey of the
passengers and crew as soon as practicable . . ." and to "without delay return
the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession." Any
party in whose territory a hijacker is found is required under Article 6 "upon
being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant . . ." to "take him into
custody or take other measures to ensure his presence . . . , and under Article
7 either to extradite or prosecute him.
55 [1949] I.C.J. 35.
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maker may have at his command the military forces capable of
rescuing a group of nationals in imminent danger abroad in a
relatively short period of time. In addition, he knows that the
capacity of the United Nations to deal with situations of this sort
is virtually nil. Therefore, he will decide either that it is more im-
portant to respect the territorial sovereignty of the foreign State -
even at the expense of human life (fiat carta ruant homines);
or he will not be deterred by questions of state sovereignty and
will use the force necessary to the protection of the endangered
nationals. A decision-maker faced with this dilemma would have
cogent humanitarian reasons for acting, and he would also be un-
der very great political pressure. Certainly both of these consid-
erations were evident in Jerusalem. To require a State to sit back
and watch the murder of innocent nationals in order to avoid vio-
lating blanket prohibitions against the use of force is, as Lillich
points out, "to stress blackletter at the expense of far more funda-
mental values."s6 The fact that Israel might have secured the
release of its nationals by complying with the terrorists' demands,
and thereby avoiding any use of force, will not alter the humani-
tarian considerations that prompted the rescue raid. Moreover,
it would be a self-defeating policy for Israel to yield control over
persons convicted of earlier acts of terrorism in order to placate
the demands of the hijackers.
Two arguments have been advanced to provide a legal basis
for a narrow right of forcible self-help to protect nationals abroad
within the framework of the Charter. The first rests upon the
belief that the territorial integrity or political independence of a
State is not impaired by an emergency action solely to rescue
nationals from a danger which the territorial State cannot or will
not prevent. Such a limited action, it is asserted, would not vio-
late Article 2(4) of the Charter.57  A second argument, adopted
by Waldock58 and Bowett,9 equates the protection of nationals
with the preservation of the State itself. This controversial6° ap-
proach asserts that armed intervention solely to suppress imminent
danger to nationals and not as a reprisal may be classified as
self-defense under Article 5 1 .61 Both of these arguments attempt
56 Lillich, supra note 32, at 344.
5 THOMAS and THOMAS, supra note 21, at 11-18.
58 Waldock, supra note 13, at 466-67.
59 BOWETT, supra note 3, at 87-105.
60 For critical views of this argument, see BROWNLIE,'supra note 4, at 299-300
and Lillich, supra note 32, at 337.
61 Fitzmaurice, who supports the right to intervene for the protection of
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to circumvent the maximum principle of nonintervention enunci-
ated in the Corfu Channel case. Both are applicable to the Entebbe
incident. Yet, the failure of the Security Council to pass a resolu-
tion after 4 days of debates,62 either condemning or condoning
the Israeli action, reflects-the continuing legal uncertainty in this
area.
What.is clear, however, and has been for some time, is the in-
ability of the United Nations to maintain peace and act within a
relatively short period of time. Acknowledgment of this reality
suggests that the old customary doctrines regarding forcible self-
help are not to be completely discarded. Jessup raised this issue
shortly after the establishment of the United Nations. He states:
It would seem that the only possible argument against the sub-
stitution of collective measures under the Security Council for
individual measures by a single state would be the inability of
the international organization to act with the speed requisite
to preserve life. It may take some time before the Security
Council, with its Military Staff Committee, and the pledged
national contingents are in a state of readiness to act in such
cases, but the Charter contemplates that international actions
shall be timely as well as powerful. 63
Obviously, Jessup's expectations have not materialized. The Se-
curity Council has become virtually paralyzed; a filibuster will
permit a military operation to be completed within a relatively
short period of time.64  Hence, as Lillich notes, 65 Jessup's "only
possible argument" can be raised today with some justification.
During the Entebbe incident, peace and justice, both impor-
tant objectives of international law, appeared to be in conflict.
The failure of the Members of the United Nations to create ef-
, ective international machinery to govern the remedial use of force
sowed the' seeds of this 'conflict. As Waldock warned, any law
"which prohibits resort to force without providing a legitimate
nationals in foreign territory on th'e ground of self-defense, notes that *such right
is controversial -"because the right is liable to abuse, and may be made the
pretext 'for poliiically motivated intervention .... ." Nevertheless, he justifies
the right because its object is protective and its basis is humaiitarian. Fitz-
mnaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint
of the Rule of Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COuRS (Hague Academy of International
Law) 5, 172-74 (11-1957).
62 31 U.N. SCOR (1939th-1943rd mtgs.), U.N. Docs. S/p.v. 1939-1943 (1976).
63 JEssuP, supra note 12, at 170-171.
64 See T. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing. Norms Governingq the
Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 810-812 (1970).
-65 Lillich, supra note 32, at 335.
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claimant with adequate alternative means of obtaining redress,
contains the seeds of trouble."66 Therefore, in an effort to pro-
vide an alternate basis upon which to justify a right to take limited
measures of forcible self-help, Professor Lillich advocates humani-
tarian grounds as a better justification.61 Under customary
international law, the primary purpose of the doctrine of humani-
tarian intervention was the protection of individuals against their
own State.68 This went beyond the protection of nationals doc-
trine in that the link between the injured individuals and the pro-
tecting State was not required. Rather, use of forcible self-help
was sanctioned "in cases in which a State maltreats its subjects
in a manner which shocks the conscience of mankind."69 Hence,
the result was a diminishing of the doctrine of absolute sover-
eignty by requiring of the State a minimum respect for human
rights. As two writers observed:
Notwithstanding the fact that such intervention impinged upon
state independence, the right of independence gave way when
it was abused. That is, in international law there are no per-
fect rights, no absolute rights. All rights must be exercised
prudently with ordinary precautions without abusing them or
exceeding their equitable limits. When a state abuses its right
of sovereignty by permitting within its territory the treatment
of its own nationals or foreigners in a manner violative of all
universal standards of humanity, any nation may step in and ex-
ercise the right of humanitarian intervention]"o
Notwithstanding the oblique references to human rights in the
United Nations Charter,7t the basic U.N. instruments on human
rights 72 call for individual and collective action to carry out their
66 Waldock, supra note 13, at 455.
67 Lillich, supra note 32, at 342.
68 Id. at 332.
69 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (1950).
70 THOMAS and THOMAS, supra note 21, at 19.
1 In the Preamble, determining the "ends" of the United Nations, it speaks
of "fundamental human rights"; in Article 1, "encouraging respect for human
rights" is provided for as a means of achieving economic and social cooperation;
and in Articles 13 and 62; the Charter speaks of "human rights" and "funda-
mental freedoms for all" in determining the competence of certain organs for
the achievement of economic and social cooperation. In addition, the Charter
does not impose upon the Members a strict obligation to grant the rights and
freedoms mentioned in the Preamble or in the text of the Charter. KELSEN,
supra note 41, at 29.
72 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural 'Rights; the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights; the Proclamation of Teheran; the International Convention
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purposes. To create or confirm obligations on the part of States
to respect "human rights" without providing for an effective rem-
edy would be a useless exercise. Therefore, the failure of the
international community to establish effective collective enforce-
ment machinery must presumably leave enforcement measures to
States or groups of States acting on their own discretion7 3
Given the lack of effective international machinery to govern
the remedial use of force, it is this writer's contention that inter-
vention justified upon humanitarian grounds is a more desirable
rationale than self-defense. First, a self-defense justification
would permit forcible self-help only where the nationals of the
acting State were the objects of protection. This is based upon
the premise that only threat of injury to the acting State's na-
tionals could be considered a threat to that State's security. The
scope of humanitarian intervention recognizes no distinction be-
tween nationals of different States and hence would provide
broader limits upon the availability of remedial use of force. An-
other advantage of a humanitarian rationale is that it would re-
quire the State to exercise the right using only the most limited
amount of force required by the particular situation. A self-
defense rationale, by its very nature, would encourage the use of
greater force by the intervening State.74
CONCLUSION
An assessment of the legality of Israel's actions at Entebbe
must inevitably rest upon the particular circumstances involved.
No blanket approval can be given to this practice for, like most
justifications of the use of force, it is open to abuse. 7s Certainly,
effective international machinery to govern when remedial use of
force is to be employed would be preferable. However, the
endemic failure of U.N. enforcement machinery makes it a solu-
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on
the Prevention or Punishment of Genocide; the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women; and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples.
73 M. McDougal and M. Reisman, Response, 3 INT'L LAW. 438 (1969), 442-
44. cf. T. Franck and N. Radley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian
Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 299-302 (1973).
74 Lillich, supra note 32, at 337.
75 "Maximum particularization of inquiry is necessary. General observa-
tions are no guide. There is only one valid focus: What kind of interference, Jor
vhat purposes, under what relevant conditions and with what probable consequences.-
Falk, The United States. and the Doctrine of Nonintervention in the Internal Affairs of
Independent States, 5 How. L. J. 163 (1959).
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tion for the future. The present international situation is further
complicated by the lack of an effective international fact-finding
system to establish who did what, when, and where. This is es-
pecially acute in a situation such as has occurred at Entebbe in
which the only available sources of information are news accounts
and self-serving statements of the involved States. Therefore,
Lillich proposes several "objective" criteria by which "the inter-
national validity of a state's resort to forcible self-help should be
judged . . ."76 They include: (1) The immediacy of violation of
human rights; (2) the extent of violation of human rights; (3) an
invitation to use forcible self-help from the territorial State; and
(4) the degree of coercive measures employed. 77
Applying this framework to the Entebbe incident, several ob-
servations can be made. First, where the danger to the individuals
is imminent and the State whose duty it is to protect them is un-
able or unwilling to do so, then forcible self-help is permissible.
There is no question in the present case as to the imminence of
the threat of death facing the hostages. Further, the strong evi-
dence of Ugandan sympathy and complicity with the terrorists
made impracticable any cooperation with or reliance on Ugandan
authorities in rescuing the hostages.
The requirement of proportionality also appears to have been
met by Israel. The measures of protection it undertook were
proportional to the imminent, threat of death hanging over the na-
tionals. The amount of force used by Israel and its duration were
reasonably calculated to accomplish the objective of the rescue:
The killing of the terrorists for obvious reasons; the firing on
Ugandan troops because of their resistance to the rescue attempt;
and the destruction of Ugandan aircraft to eliminate the possibil-
ity of pursuit of the Israeli force.
Finally, Lillich discounts as a valid criteria the "relative dis-
interestedness" of the acting State: "Generally, a state only re-
sorts to force to protect its own nationals, most certainly the prime
instance of self-interest. " 78  Hence, where the overriding motive
is humanitarian, the presence of self-interest should not preclude
resort to forcible self-help.
The terrorists who hijacked the Air France jetliner recognized
no law and were apparently ready to kill innocent people if their
demands were not met. The humanitarian considerations involved
76 Lillich, supra note 32, at 345, 347-351.
7 Id.
18 Id. at 350.
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in this particular case justify the temporary breach of Ugandan
territorial sovereignty, especially in light of the separation of Jew-
ish hostages reminiscent of the Nazi selection process. Certainly,
the unusual circumstances of this specific case limit its prece-
dential value. However, for those rare occasions, such as at En-
tebbe, where a violation of human rights will prompt extraordinary
measures, their legitimacy can only be condemned, as Falk has
emphasized, "by a too vigorous waving of the banners of sover-
eignty. '79
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79 Falk, supra note 75, at 167.
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University, 1978.
